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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE PUBLIC FORUM IN NONTRADITIONAL
AREAS-Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
In 1970, Harry Lehman, a candidate for election to the Ohio state
legislature, attempted to purchase advertising space' on local buses
belonging to the city of Shaker Heights' rapid transit system.2 Al-
though space was available, the advertising agent for the transit com-
pany rejected Lehman's request because its contract with the city pro-
scribed political advertising on buses.3 Lehman sought a declaratory
judgment and an injunction, alleging violation of the first and four-
teenth amendments. The trial court denied relief, and the state su-
preme court affirmed. 4
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. 5 In
the plurality opinion, Justice Blackmun concluded that no first
amendment public forum existed and that no equal protection viola-
tion had occurred. Concurring in the result, Justice Douglas argued
that there was no constitutional right to spread a message before a
captive audience on a public bus. Justice Brennan, speaking for the
dissent, 6 maintained that the city itself had created a public forum by
accepting and displaying commercial advertising. Having opened such
a forum, the city could not discriminate solely upon the subject matter
I. Lehman's proposed placard contained his picture and read:
"HARRY J. LEHMAN IS OLD-FASHIONED!
ABOUT HONESTY, INTEGRITY AND GOOD GOVERNMENT
"State Representative-District 56 [X] Harry J. Lehman."
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 299 (1974).
2. The Shaker Heights' rapid transit system had been municipally owned and
operated since 1944. Appendix to Briefs for Appellants and Respondents at 30A.
3. The applicable clause of the contract read: "The CONTRACTOR shall not place
political advertising in or upon any of the said CARS or in. upon or about any other ad-
ditional and further space granted hereunder." 418 U.S. at 299-300. Except for its po-
litical content, Lehman's advertisement met the standards promulgated by the Metro
Transit Division of Metromedia, Inc., advertising agent for the City of Shaker Heights.
Id. at 309 (Brennan, J.. dissenting). Previously, the city's buses had displayed adver-
tisements from banks, liquor and cigarette companies, retail and service establishments.
churches, civic and public service oriented groups. Id. at 300.
4. 34 Ohio St. 2d 143, 296 N.E.2d 683 (1973). The Ohio Supreme Court split
4-3. The majority concluded that no public forum existed and that the regulation in
question constituted permissible control of commercial advertising. Id. at 685-86. The
dissent, focusing on the equal protection issue, argued that under the circumstances
presented in Lehman commercial and political advertising were similar and that no
appropriate governmental interest warranted the prohibition of the latter. Id. at 688-90
(Stern, J., dissenting).
5. Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices White and
Rehnquist. Justice Douglas concurred only in the judgment. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
6. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell. Id at 308.
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of the message. To do so, he contended, violated both the first and
fourteenth amendments.
In upholding the proscription of political advertising on buses, the
Supreme Court effectively halted the trend of many courts to find
public forums for first amendment purposes in circumstances analo-
gous to those in Lehman.7 The decision, therefore, marks a constric-
tion of the concept of the public forum as a vehicle for determining
the existence of some first amendment rights. More important, how-
ever, the Lehman opinions indicate doctrinal confusion about use of
the public forum concept in locations not traditionally considered
arenas for public expression.
This note will develop an analytic framework for examining the use
of the public forum concept in nontraditional areas and will apply. it
to the Court's reasoning in Lehman. In so doing, the inconsistencies in
the existing use of public forum language will be brought into focus.
Clearly defined, these inconsistencies demonstrate the latent danger to
the exercise of first amendment rights inherent in the present doctrine.
The existence of such latent danger indicates that the existing bifur-
cated approach to public forum analysis should be replaced by a uni-
tary balancing test.8
I. EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM CONCEPT
A. Origins of the Bifurcated Approach
The development of the public forum concept, like that of first
amendment law in general, represents a relatively recent phenomenon
in our constitutional history. Nineteenth century freedom of speech
7. In each of the following cases public buses were found to be public forums:
Stoner v. Thompson, 377 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Ga. 1974) (removal of political adver-
tising from public buses pursuant to mayor's directive enjoined); Wirta v. Alameda-
Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967)
(preliminary injunction requiring acceptance of anti-Vietnam war advertisements af-
firmed); Hillside Community Church v. City of Tacoma, 76 Wn. 2d 63, 455 P.2d 350
(1969) (specific performance of contract for anti-Vietnam war advertisements re-
quired). See also Kissinger v. New York Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (summary judgment for defendant denied in action challenging its refusal to
accept anti-Vietnam posters on subways and in subway stations).
8. For an explanation of the evolution of the "bifurcated approach" to public forum
analysis see Part I infra. The efficacy of the "unitary balancing approach" is discussed
in Part III infra.
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cases were nonexistent," and when the first confrontations with such
issues occurred, speech did not emerge the victor.
Commentators t 0 tend to trace the evolution of the public forum to
Judge (later Justice) Holmes' decision while sitting on the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Davis.II The Davis
court upheld the conviction of a Baptist preacher for violating a city
ordinance requiring a permit to speak on Boston Commons. Judge
Holmes wrote: 1 2
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of
the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private
house to forbid it in his house.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, endorsing the Holmes
position. 1 3
The Davis decision survived for almost forty years until it collided
with the dictum of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO.14 In Hague, the
Court confronted the claim of the Mayor of Jersey City that the city's
ordinance requiring a permit for a meeting in a public park was justi-
fied under the Davis rationale. The Court rejected the contention, and
9. Justice Brennan has suggested that the first amendment did not become a -lively
issue" until after 125 years of the country's history because during the earlier period
legal questions involved:
not so much problems of individual liberty as problems of the respective domains
of federal and state powers incident to territorial expansion and economic
growth .. . .Issues of individual liberty and the relationship of the citizen to his
government waited in the wings pending the events of this century that brought
them to the fore.
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meikeljohn Interpretation of the First Atnend-
ment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1965).
10. See, e.g., Kalven, The Concept of the Public Foruin: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SuP. CT. REv. 1 [hereinafter cited as Kalven]; Horning, The First Amendment Right
to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Horning]. But
see Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 177
(1966).
11. 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113(1895).
12. Id.
13. 167 U.S. 43 (1897). The Court has been chided for failing to recognize the
real issue, that of the essential right of freedom of speech:
The logic of the Court's decision ignores this argument for the question raised
was the existence of such a common law right and, if capable of infringement
by any means, whether this right had been infringed by the action of the Boston
city government. To answer that the state possesses the power, in some manner,
to abolish or limit general common law rights was to state the obvious. What the
Court left unanswered, however, was the question of whether the state can in-
fringe common law speech rights.
Horning, supra note 10, at 934 (emphasis in original).
14. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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Justice Roberts articulated the foundation for the concept of the
public forum:15
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
The Court went on to note that the right to such a forum "is not abso-
lute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the gen-
eral comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and
good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied."' 6
The Hague opinion established an elemental definition of the public
forum and provided an historical justification for its implementation.
In his elucidation of the criteria for the existence of a public forum,
Justice Roberts invoked the tenet of the English common law that the
parks and streets historically have been open to public speech and as-
sembly. Thus, he defined the limits geographically-i.e., within the
public areas defined by the common law, the state cannot absolutely
proscribe speech activity. A kind of first amendment easement is cre-
ated.' 7
Under the Hague approach, the recognition of the existence of such
an easement does not ipso facto legitimize any activity and insulate
the speaker from regulation, however. Rather, if important interests
exist in conflict with the exercise of first amendment rights, the state
can impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of
that activity.' 8 Such regulatory authority, because it cannot proscribe
15. Id. at 515. It has been noted that Justice Roberts' dictum was launched with a
shaky endorsement from his fellow Justices, since only Justice Black joined the opinion
and Chief Justice Hughes concurred only in part. Kalven, supra note 10, at 13-14. The
continued validity of the dictum is suggested by its frequent modern quotation, includ-
ing that of Justice Blackmun in Lehman. See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
16. 307 U.S. at 516 (emphasis added).
17. Kalven, supra note 10, at 13. The requirement has also been characterized as
"the 'constitutional obligation' of the government to provide access to certain facilities
of mass communication as an irreducibly minimal forum for the communication of
ideas." Horning, supra note 10, at 937.
18. The specific language of "time, place, and manner" regulation originated in Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Since that time, it has been frequently recited
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speech, is that of the policeman and not the censor. 19
This distinction between determining the existence of a public
forum and regulating the time, place, and manner of first amendment ac-
tivity within the forum, is pivotal. In the case of the former, the court
determines whether any first amendment activity is protected and in-
sulated from absolute proscription; in the latter; it determines whether
a particular activity is subject to regulation. Thus, the Court in Hague
by implication suggested a bifurcated approach to determine the exist-
ence of first amendment rights in public areas. The tests involved can
be illustrated as follows:
YesTest I :NA protected
NoB )
Test No N B C unprotected
Test 1 determines whether a public forum exists. If none is found, the
speech is unprotected. As indicated above, under the Hague formula
this issue is geographically determined. But the diagram also indicates
that an activity may still be unprotected if a forum exists. If, under
Test 2, a court finds that the activity is subject to reasonable restric-
tions of time, place, and manner, it is unprotected notwithstanding the
existence of a public forum. Conversely, speech activity is protected
only if Test 1 finds the existence of a public forum, and Test 2 deter-
mines that no restrictions can be imposed. Thus, at Point A the speech
activity is protected; it is not at Points B and C. The conclusion that a
public forum exists is necessarily a threshold determination-only if a
first amendment easement is found can a question of its use arise.
in cases involving expression in public places. For example, the Court in Cox v.
Louisiana (Cox 11) articulated the requirement as follows:
[0] ur constitutional command of free speech and assembly is basic and funda-
mental and encompasses peaceful protest, so important to the preservation of the
freedoms treasured in a democratic society .... [However,] the right of peace-
ful protest does not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may
do so at any time and at any place. There is a proper time and place for even
the most peaceful protest, and a plain duty and responsibility on the part of all
citizens to obey all valid laws and regulations.
379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965). See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text infra.
19. Horning, supra note 10, at 937.
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B. The Evolution of Bifurcation
The development of the approach enunciated in Hague v. CIO has
been erratic and sometimes tacit, but the public forum concept has
remained bifurcated. However, the analytically distinct tests have fre-
quently been blended, and in some cases have been merged into a uni-
tary test in fact. While this process did not pose analytic difficulties
when the Court expanded the boundaries of the public forum,2 0 Leh-
man clearly illustrates the inconsistencies and dangers which result
when those boundaries are constricted.
The blending of these discrete tests has occurred in part because
the Supreme Court has often assumed the existence of a forum vkhen
confronted with a first amendment challenge in a public place. In such
cases, the Court has focused on the second test of the bifurcated ap-
proach, the issue of the constitutional validity of imposing regulations
of time, place, and manner within clearly existent public forums.2 l
Just as the Jehovah's Witness cases of the 1930's and 1940's fre-
quently involved proselytizing in traditional public forums, 22 so too
the resurgence of such cases in the 1960's often involved demonstra-
tions in clearly established forums.23
In the usual public forum case of this type, the Court has examined
the extent to which a particular activity was subject to regulation. To
make this determination, it has utilized a balancing approach,
weighing the interests of the state against those of the individual in
20. See note 93 and accompanying text infra.
21: See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (sidewalk adja-
cent to public school); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (sidewalk); Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (public street); Gregory v. City of
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (public street); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965),
379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Cox II) (sidewalk adjacent to courthouse); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (State House grounds); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315 (1951) (public street corner); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)
(public.auditorium); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (public street); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (public street); Thomas v. Collins, 332 U.S. 516
(1945) (city hall); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (public street); Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (public street).
22. More than thirty first amendment cases came before the Court during this pe-
riod, the decided majority of which involved Jehovah's Witnesses. Kalven, supra note
10, at 1 n.2. For a compilation of the cases and a summary of their effect on the
law of expression in public places see Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273-89
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (march
on public street); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (march on public
street); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (demonstration on sidewalk adjacent
to courthouse); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (demonstration on
State House grounds). See generally Kalven, supra note 10.
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delivering his or her message. 24 Since freedom of expression occupies
a "preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional protections,
the Court has required the state to demonstrate substantial counter-
vailing interests in order to inhibit speech activity.25
This balancing of interests between the state and the individual has
spilled over into cases where the existence of the public forum itself is
in issue. This is the first test of the bifurcated approach. In such cases,
24. The reason for using an ad hoc balancing approach in first amendment cases
has been perhaps best articulated by Justice Frankfurter in the context of determining
the validity of a Smith Act prosecution:
The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in
national security are better served by a candid and informed weighing of the com-
peting interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing
dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be solved.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In the context of regulating speech in public places, similar problems of non-Euclidian
precision exist, and the Court's resultant methodology has been the same. However.
there has been a reticence to use the label "balancing" for the process. This tendency
can be traced to Justice Black's "absolutist" position and his fear of balancing away
first amendment freedoms. For a juxtaposition of the balancing and absolutist positions.
see the exchange between Justices Harlan and Black in Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). To circumvent Justice Black's position while main-
taining a flexible standard, the Court developed the "speech pure/speech plus" dichot-
omy whereby pure speech could not be regulated, but if speech and conduct were com-
bined, the conduct was subject to regulation. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965). However, since all speech necessarily involves some conduct, the Court has de
facto accomplished what it has been reluctant to recognize de jure. See Kalven, supra
note 10, at 23.
The efficacy of ad hoc balancing has been criticized by numerous commentators, and
alternative methodologies recommended. See, e.g., A. MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (definitional approach); DuVal, Free
Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach
to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161 (1972); Nimmer, The
Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and
Misapplied to Privacy. 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968) (definitional interest balancing);
Note, The Speech and Press Clause of the First Amendment as Ordinary Language. 87
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1973) (plain language analysis).
25. The notion of "preferred position" springs from footnote 4 in United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938). In the first amendment context.
this concept has been interpreted to mean that regulation of time, place, and manner
of "speech plus" activities may occur only in order to further significant governmental
interests. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Poulos v. New Hampshire.
345 U.S. 395 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). The concept has
been recently expanded to encompass conduct without speech, or so-called symbolic
expression. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (displaying inverted
flag); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing arm-
bands to school); cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burn-
ing unprotected). The articulation of this principle in the first amendment context be-
came virtually indistinguishable from the protections of the equal protection clause. See
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). The notion of preferred
position has not gone without criticism, however. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77.
89 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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the Court has by implication determined whether or not a public
forum existed by examining and balancing the interests of the partic-
ular parties before it. Thus, in Brown v. Louisiana,26 the court implic-
itly found that a library was a public forum by concluding that the
appellant's silent protest was an appropriate exercise of first amend-
ment rights there. Similarly, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,27 the Court balanced the rights of the
school against those of its arm-banded students, and concluded that a
school is a public forum for appropriate speech activity.
This blending of the two discrete tests suggested in Hague v. CIO
has also occurred when the Court has found that no forum exists. In
Adderley v. Florida,28 the general public forum test was blended into
the more specific individual activity test. Justice Black concluded that
the state could proscribe general speech activity in a jailhouse yard
through enforcement of its general trespass statute. In drawing this
conclusion, however, Justice Black focused on the appropriateness of
the particular activity engaged in by the appellants.
The evolution of the two public forum tests into one inquiry can be
seen most clearly in the cases involving speech activity on private
property. In the initial extensions of the public forum to private prop-
erty locations, the Court explicitly preserved the two-step approach of
Hague. Marsh v. Alabama,29 the first such private property case, is a
good example. In Marsh, the Court concluded that a public forum
existed and that there were no restrictions on the appellant's distribu-
tion of religious literature on the street corner of a company town.
Such activity was protected by the first amendment. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court also replaced Justice Roberts' definitional ap-
proach of the public forum as developed in Hague v. CIO with a
functional equivalency test. 30 More than twenty years later, in Amal-
26. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
27. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
28. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
29. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
30. Justice Roberts' enunciation of the threshold determination of public forum
analysis relied on analogy to the geographical limits of the English common law. See
text accompanying notes 16 & 17 supra. These limits provided a definitional test for the
existence of a public forum which could be applied easily in similar geographical set-
tings. See, e.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). When first amendment chal-
lenges were raised ih areas outside those boundaries, however, the need for greater
flexibility militated for a different approach. Justice Black accomplished the neces-
sary expansion by concluding that the "business block" of Chickasaw, Alabama, was
149
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gamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,31 the
Court again applied both the two-step public forum test and the
Marsh functional equivalency language, this time to a shopping center
mall.32
Logan Valley, with its explicit recognition of separate tests, sur-
vived for four years, until the Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner.33 In Lloyd, Justice Powell concluded that no public forum
existed in a shopping center because the distribution of anti-Vietnam
war literature was unrelated to the primary use of the property and
because alternative locations existed for the expression of the respon-
dent's ideas. Although he maintained that the Court was only limiting
Logan Valley to its holding, 34 Justice Powell in fact combined public
forum analysis in private property cases into a unitary inquiry.35
Such cases dealing with both public and private property sug-
gest that the bifurcated approach of Hague may have become unitary,
functionally identical to the public places of the English common law. In reaching his
conclusion, Justice Black emphasized that the nature of the supposed forum, and not
the location or title, should determine the existence of first amendment rights. 326 U.S.
at 507-08.
31. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
32. Justice Marshall, speaking for five members of the Court, expanded the con-
cept suggested in Marsh to include areas not functionally identical to those of the
English common law. Despite the sweep of his language, however, he concluded:
All we decide here is that because the shopping center serves as the community
business block . . . the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its
trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise
their First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose gen-
erally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put.
391 U.S. at 319-20 (citation omitted). Justice Black dissented because he maintained
that his opinion in Marsh required private property to possess all the attributes of public
property before it could be considered functionally equivalent to public property. Id. at
332 (Black, J., dissenting). The Logan Valley approach did not represent a radical
departure from the trend of private property speech cases, however. Indeed, it had been
presaged by lower court decisions. See, e.g., Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery
Workers Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 906 (1965) (injunction dissolved proscribing picketing at privately owned
shopping center); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center.
Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963) (right to distribute handbills at privately
owned shopping center recognized); Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Local
444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1963) (summary judgment to enjoin picketing
denied).
33. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The Lloyd decision has been the subject of extensive
commentary. See, e.g., Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The Demise of Logan Valley and
the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1973); Comment, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner:
Handbilling in a Shopping Center-First Amendment, 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOCIAL CHANGE
70 (1973); 27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 219 (1972); Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: Death of
the Public Forum?, 7 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 582 (1973); 1973 Wis. L. REV. 612.
34. 407 U.S. at 560. See note 32 supra.
35. Under the Lloyd formula, the existence of a public forum, and hence of first
amendment protections on private property, is an ad hoc determination. By enumerat-
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and that the existence of a public forum is an ad hoc determination
made vis-b.-vis each individual's speech activity. However, two factors
militate against these conclusions.
First, the Supreme Court has developed doctrine which recognizes
a distinction between a public forum generally and the protections of
individual speech specifically. In licensing cases, for example, the
Court has struck down regulations which impose impermissible prior
restraints on speech activity in public places, regardless of the partic-
ular activity involved.36 Such actions suggest the continued efficacy of
the notion of a general first amendment easement in public places.
This conclusion is reinforced by the recurrent invoking of Justice Rob-
erts' dictum in Hague, language which makes sense only in terms of a
general public forum and not an individual inquiry.37
The Court has also prescribed additional protections which arise
when a public forum is found. Justice Marshall in Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley stated:38
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups,
government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on
the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public
forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone.
ing the prerequisites to finding such protection the Court not only substituted a unitary
approach for a bifurcated one, it replaced a balancing test with a definitional one. See
note 30 and accompanying text supra. For an interpretation of the implications of such
a shift in terms of plain language analysis see Comment, The Speech and Press Clause
of the First Amendment as Ordinary Language, 87 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1973).
36. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (ordinance prohibiting use
of sound amplification equipment except by permission of police chief invalid); Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (ordinance requiring license to solicit in-
valid); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (ordinance requiring permission
of city manager to distribute literature invalid). More recently, the Court struck down
such statutes for vagueness or overbreadth. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611 (1971) (vagueness); Cox. v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1966) (overbreadth). The
continued applicability of these doctrines may be circumscribed because of the current
Court's attitude toward their use. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (phrase
"conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" in Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice not impermissibly vague); Broadrick .v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (Okla-
homa statute proscribing political involvement by state employees not void for vague-
ness or overbreadth); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (Hatch Act proscribing political involvement by federal
employees not void for vagueness or overbreadth).
37. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Wolin v.
Port Authority of New York, 392 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
38. 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
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The existence of such a guarantee presupposes a public forum of gen-
eral applicability.
The second factor which indicates that the bifurcated approach of
Hague has not become unitary is that state and lower federal courts
recognize the public forum concept. In finding forums in areas such as
airports, 39 bus terminals, 40 railroad stations, 41 welfare offices 42 and
migrant camps, 43 as well as public buses, 44 the courts conceive the
public forum to be an area where speech can be regulated but not pro-
scribed. In many of these opinions, the tests become blurred; yet the
determination that a public forum exists and that an individual activity
is protected remains conceptually distinct. The former is a prerequisite
to the determination of the latter.
II. LEHMAN AND THE PUBLIC FORUM
A. The Analytic Insufficiencies
Justice Blackmun was unequivocal in his conclusion in Lehman: "No
First Amendment forum is here to be found." 45 In reaching this con-
clusion, he alluded to Justice Roberts' dictum in Hague v. CIO:46
"Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street comer or
other public thoroughfare." Thus, the Court did not analogize the
Shaker Heights' bus to other public areas previously found to be
public forums, nor did it draw upon state and lower federal court de-
cisions which found forums to exist in circumstances virtually iden-
39. Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.
1975).
40. Wolin v. Port Authority of New York, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied.
393 U.S. 940 (1968).
41. In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
42. Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1974).
43. Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (C.D. Mich. 1971).
44. See note 7 supra.
45. 418 U.S. at 304.
46. Id. at 303. Compare the Court's statement in Lehman with that of a federal
district court in a case decided only two weeks earlier, involving almost identical facts:
Buses operated daily by the City of Macon for the transportation of the public-
like the city streets, city sidewalks, city auditorium, city coliseum, and city parks
-are appropriate places for the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Stoner v. Thompson, 377 F. Supp. 585, 587 (M.D. Ga. 1974). While Stoner can be
distinguished because Macon had allowed some political advertising on buses in the
past, the conclusion that a bus constituted a public forum is diametrically opposite to
the holding in Lehman.
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tical to those in Lehman.47 Rather, its language implied that a public
bus was geographically inappropriate for the exercise of first amend-
ment rights. Taken literally, this conclusion suggests the resurrection
of the geographical limits of the English common law for the
threshold determination of the existence of a public forum.
However, it is clear that the Court did not intend this result. While
it did invoke the explicit language of the Hague approach, it indicated
that some sort of balancing of competing interests must occur. Justice
Blackmun stated:48
Although American constitutional jurisprudence, in the light of the
First Amendment, has been jealous to preserve access to public places
for purposes of free speech, the nature of the forum and the conflicting
interests involved have remained important in determining the degree
of protection afforded by the Amendment to the speech in question.
Analysis of the "degree of protection" to be afforded particular speech
activity presupposes the existence of a public forum under the bifur-
cated approach of Hague v. CIO, and involves the determination of
time, place, and manner regulation. The above-quoted language in
Lehman suggests that the Court, as it has in the past,49 blended the
two separate tests of public forum analysis.
But the plurality in Lehman also confused the results of the dis-
tinct inquiries, and it is this confusion which can result in diminished
first amendment rights. This can be seen clearly in the Court's articula-
tion of what appears to be the underlying fear:50
Were we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public hospitals, li-
braries, office buildings, military compounds, and other public facili-
ties immediately would become Hyde Parks open to every would-be
pamphleteer and politician. This the Constitution does not require.
Finding the existence of a public forum would not lead inexorably to
this result. The argument's fallacy is the premise that the existence of
a forum precludes regulation of time, place, and manner. Under tradi-
tional theory,51 even if a forum exists, a particular activity may be
subject to such regulation. Thus, the conclusion that a bus or a hos-
47. See note 7 supra.
48. 418 U.S. at 302-03.
49. See Part I-B supra.
50. 418 U.S. at 304.
51. See text accompanying notes 18 & 19 supra.
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pital is a forum does not open up such areas to unrestricted political
propaganda. The finding of a forum, rather than negating the state's
regulatory role as policeman, only eliminates its role as censor.
The diagram used above52 illustrates the potential danger in con-
fusing the inquiries of traditional public forum analysis. If a court con-
cludes that an activity is not protected, a substantial difference in im-
plication exists if the conclusion is based on lack of a public forum
(Point C), or on legitimate state interests in regulating the particular
activity within the forum (Point B). If in a subsequent case, a court
adopts the Lehman holding (i.e., no public forum), it may conclude that
all speech activity is unprotected, since the conclusion at Test 1 that no
forum exists precludes ever applying Test 2. Thus, if other parties
seek an audience on the Shaker Heights' bus and can show that their
advertisement is not subject to the same criticism as Lehman's,5 3 the
city can nevertheless refuse to allow it because it has been determined
that no public forum exists. In effect, then, the Lehman test may de-
termine the nonavailability of buses as public forums in subsequent
cases regardless of the variables in the individual fact situations. This
danger militates for adoption of a unitary balancing approach. 54
This conclusion gives the company the ability to act as censor-it
can regulate access to its medium based on the content of the mes-
sage.55 Within a public forum such regulation based on subject matter
is expressly forbidden; yet by concluding that such a forum does not
52. See Part I-A supra.
53. See text accompanying note 70 infra.
54. See Part III infra.
55. While the extent of this de facto censorship is circumscribed by other consti-
tutional restraints (e.g., the equal protection clause), permissible exclusions can be
made, many of which can lead to incongruous results. The California Supreme Court
enumerated some of these incongruous possibilities which can result if a bus system is
allowed to exclude certain types of advertising as allowed by Lehman:
A cigarette company is permitted to advertise the desirability of smoking its brand,
but a cancer society is not entitled to caution by advertisements that cigarette
smoking is injurious to health. A theater may advertise a motion picture that por-
trays sex and violence, but the Legion for Decency has no right to post a message
calling for clean films. A lumber company may advertise its wood products, but a
conservation group cannot implore citizens to write to the President or Governor
about protecting our natural resources....
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 57, 434 P.2d 982, 986, 64
Cal. Rptr. 430, 434-35 (1967), quoted in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
at 318 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The court in Wirta concluded:
The foregoing prohibitions cannot be ascribed to whimsical or aberrant conduct
of the district's management; they are the vices inexorably resulting from any de-
liberate effort to circumscribe First Amendment rights.
68 Cal. 2d at 57, 434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
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exist, this first amendment tenet can be circumvented. 56
Because of the lack of clarity in the Court's explanation and the
undiscussed implications of finding no public forum, it is unclear
whether the Court meant that no forum existed vis-h-vis any first
amendment activity, or whether it meant only that Lehman's placards
were unprotected.57 In other words, the Court may have intended to
place Shaker Heights' buses at Point B rather than at Point C. Given
the potential far-reaching implications of the latter conclusion, the
former is preferable.
B. Inadequacies of the Lehman Test
1. Failure to consider all relevant criteria
Beyond the analytical inconsistency, the test applied by the Court
was inadequate for it failed to incorporate three criteria heretofore
considered relevant in public forum analysis. First, the Court failed to
adequately analyze the appropriateness of speech activity in general or
Lehman's activity in particular in relation to the proposed forum. Jus-
tice Blackmun suggested that because the city was engaged in com-
merce a lesser degree of protection could be afforded to first amend-
ment activity. 58 In so doing, he may have been analogizing to the test
in Lloyd which requires that first amendment activity on private prop-
erty be "in consonance" with the owner's intended use of the prop-
erty.59 However, other cases involving speech on public property have
emphasized the extent of interference with the area, not the relation of
the speech to it.60
Second, the Court neglected to examine whether a relevant audi-
ence existed for Lehman's placard, a factor considered important in
lower court opinions.61 At trial, Lehman testified that the majority of
56. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
57. This same criticism has been made of the Court's decision in Adderley v. Flor-
ida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). See Homing, supra note 10, at 945.
58. 418 U.S. at303.
59. See notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text supra.
60. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969), in which the Court focused on the level of interference of the speech activity
within the forum.
61. In Wolin v. Port Authority of New York, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968), the court indicated that the relevant inquiry for determination of
the existence of a public forum is the appropriateness of first amendment activity to the
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the transit company's 6,000 to 8,000 daily passengers resided in his
legislative district.6 2 Thus, the bus clearly provided him with an avail-
able audience. Moreover, as a practical matter, elimination of the bus
system as an advertising medium may have economically precluded
Lehman from ever reaching his audience. 63
Third, the Court demonstrated insensitivity to the importance of
the first amendment rights involved. There is a noticeable lack of re-
cital as to the preferred position of such rights; indeed, Justice
Blackmun indicated that the transit company's exclusionary policy "is
little different from deciding to impose a 10-, 25-, or 35-cent fare, or
from changing schedules or the location of bus stops ....,,4
particular location. A location is appropriate if either of two criteria are met: the speech
activity is related to the purpose of the place; or, a relevant audience exists there. Id. at
89. The Wolin court determined that although the speech activity was unrelated to the
bus terminal, the existence of a relevant audience meant that the location was appro-
priate and the speech protected. Thus the relation of the speech to the area is not an
exclusive factor to be considered in determining whether a public forum exists.
62. 418 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. In terms of cost, the bus placards represent a relatively inexpensive way to
reach a large audience. Shaker Heights rapid transit operated 55 buses each with 20
places for advertising. 418 U.S. at 300 n.3. The monthly rate was approximately $2.90
per card per bus (exclusive of the cost of making the placard). Appendix to Briefs for
Appellants and Respondents at 27A.
With bus placard advertising foreclosed, a candidate would have to turn to more
expensive mailings, newspaper advertising, purchasing of broadcast time. or to more
time-consuming (though relatively inexpensive) handbilling. Candidates may find such
added costs and/or time prohibitively expensive. For example, the author's survey of
the metropolitan Seattle area produced the following figures illustrative of the relative
disparity in cost of advertising methods:
1. Television* ...... ....................... $500-I 100
2. Radio* ....... ......................... $25-50
3. Newspapers** ....... ..................... $1500
4. Buses*** ....... ........................ $2.70
*Television and radio figures are based on a single 30-second spot for a local audience
at prime time. " *The newspaper figure represents a one-half page daily ad for one day.
***Bus advertising is based on the monthly rate per card per bus for interior adver-
tisements in a quantity less than 300.
In addition, individuals or groups not seeking office, but desiring a forum to air their
views may be effectively foreclosed from reaching a large proportion of their desired
audience because of the prohibitive cost of alternative advertising methods. Thus, offi-
cials like those regulating advertising for the city in Lehman can operate as de facto
censors by limiting access to the only economically feasible available forum.
This criticism was also raised by Justice Marshall in the Lloyd dissent. He argued
that the practical effect of the holding there was to eliminate perhaps the only avail-
able arena where the poor could reach a substantial audience at a small cost. 407 U.S.
at 580-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This theme also pervades much of the commen-
tary on Lloyd. See note 33 supra. To the extent that this actually occurs. Lehnan will
exacerbate the results. The shrinking of the public forum does not cut across class lines
equally. As less expensive arenas are cut off as forums, the poor suffer a dispropor-
tionate loss.
64. 418 U.S. at 304.
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This assertion also fails to consider the particular nature of the
speech activity involved. This is not a case of producing the musical
Hair in a local auditorium, 65 or of determining if wrestling is expres-
sive conduct.66 Rather, as the dissent pointed out,67 Lehman's placard
contained a political message, an expression warranting special con-
sideration under the first amendment. By allowing proscription of such
messages, the Court dampened the "uninhibited, robust, and wide
open" debate on public issues which the Court has frequently asserted
to be an underlying purpose of the first amendment. 68
2. Failure to adequately balance competing interests
The failure to adequately discuss the first and fourteenth amend-
ment rights involved on Lehman's side of the balance contrasts
sharply with the Court's ready acceptance of the respondent's asser-
tions of conflicting interests.69 Each of the reasons expounded by the
65. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir.
1972).
66. Murdock v. City ofJacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
67. 418 U.S. at 310-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964). Although New York Times involved the narrow issue of libel, it has
been frequently cited in other first amendment contexts. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964) (criminal defamation of judges); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcasting); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972) (public demonstrations). Because of the extensive use of its lan-
guage, it has been suggested that the Court is recognizing a central meaning in the first
amendment. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Mean-
ing of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191. According to the theory
purportedly underlying New York Times, the first amendment is the repository of the
power of self-government and the act of governing encompasses debate and discussion
on public issues without infringement. See generally A. MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). See also T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1963); Comment, The Speech and Press Clause
of the First Amendment as Ordinary Language, 87 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1973). Since
the activity in Lehman involved precisely the type of debate on public issues envisaged
by Professor Meikeljohn, adherence to his position arguably would lead to the opposite
conclusion reached by the Court in Lehman.
69. In terms of subjecting state action to scrutiny to determine if a violation of
equal protection had occurred, the Court's analysis of the transit company's arguments
was inadequate. The Court in Lehman appears to have utilized a "rational basis" test
to determine if there was a violation of the equal protection clause:
The city consciously has limited access to its transit system advertising space in
order to minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of
imposing upon a captive audience. These are reasonable legislative objectives ad-
vanced by the city in a proprietary capacity.
418 U.S. at 304. In utilizing this standard, the Court ignored the strict scrutiny test tra-
ditionally applied when a fundamental right such as speech is involved. See Police
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Court for accepting the respondent's position, as well as Justice Doug-
las' explanation in concurrence, relied more on assertion than on
thoughtful analysis. The specific justifications given by the plurality
were recited in a litany by Justice Blackmun:70
Revenue earned from long-term commercial advertising could be jeop-
ardized by a requirement that short-term candidacy or issue-oriented
advertisements be displayed on car cards. Users would be subjected to
the blare of political propaganda. There could be lurking doubts about
favoritism, and sticky administrative problems might arise in par-
celing out limited space to eager politicians.
Like the commerce argument,71 each of these assertions can be chal-
lenged.72
The contention that long-term revenues would be jeopardized rests
on one or both of two questionable premises. The first is that the crea-
tion of a public forum would impose a requirement that the city re-
duce its commercial advertising in order to accept that of political
candidates. However, the conclusion that a public forum exists means
only that political advertising which meets the requisite format re-
quirements cannot be excluded from available space because of its
content. 73 The second premise suggests that because political or issue-
oriented advertising is more offensive than commercial or public ser-
vice announcements, advertisers will be less willing to have their prod-
ucts presented with such messages. However, it is fallacious to argue
that political advertising is more offensive than other types of mes-
sages.74 Moreover, the creation of a forum would not insulate political
Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring). See also The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 84
HARV. L. REV. 43, 149 (1974).
70. 418 U.S. at 304.
71. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
72. When confronted with virtually identical arguments, the California Supreme
Court concluded:
These pragmatic hurdles are no more relevant to a public forum when it is a
motor coach than they are to a public park or a school auditorium. The endorse-
ment of an opinion expressed in an advertisement on a motor coach is no more
attributable to the transit district than the view of a speaker in a public park is to
the city administration or the tenets of an organization using school property for
meetings is to the local school board.
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 58, 434 P.2d 982, 989,
64 Cal. Rptr. 430, 437 (1967).
73. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
74. The examples suggested by the California Supreme Court in Wirta indicate the
shallowness of this reasoning. See note 55 supra.
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advertising from the format requirements applicable to other placards.
The state can still legitimately regulate such messages pursuant to
time, place, and manner. At the same time, this premise avoids the
economics of advertising. It is the audience to be reached which con-
cerns the advertiser, not the content of the adjacent message.75 In
sum, then, it is by no means clear-indeed, it is highly conjectural-.
that revenues would be lost by accepting political advertising.
The suggestion that users would be subject to the blare of political
propaganda is substantially undermined by the fact that the transit
district already accepted advertisements. Substantively, political ad-
vertising is no more propagandistic than the already accepted public
service announcements.76 Moreover, since placards already blare ad-
vertising propaganda to some extent, the marginal effect of changing
the transit company's policy to allow political announcements would
probably be slight.
Finally, arguments about lurking doubts as to favoritism and sticky
administrative problems are spurious. In an era where the mass media
inundate society with commercial and political advertising, it is naive
to suggest that the consumer believes that the medium which carries
the message necessarily advocates its content.77 Messages by com-
peting brands or competing candidates need evidence no favoritism.78
Moreover, fear of awkward administrative problems does not deter
action by legislative or administrative agencies in a myriad of other
areas. Certainly, a program short of absolute proscription could be
evolved which would balance administrative problems with the com-
peting and fundamental rights of open expression.79
75. See J. MERRILL & R. LOWENSTEIN, MEDIA, MESSAGES, AND MEN 79-88 (1971).
While the authors' argument is addressed to the traditional mass media, it is apropos
to Lehman. The concern of advertisers-selling their products-is identical, whether
the message is contained on a bus placard or on a television commercial.
76. The dissent spoke of the existing "bland commercialism and noncontroversial
public service messages .... " 418 U.S. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, it
is by no means clear that commercial advertising is less offensive than political an-
nouncements. Indeed, in the situations posited by the California Supreme Court in
Wirta, the proscribed messages are arguably less offensive than the commercial ones.
See note 55 supra.
77. At least no evidence was introduced as to the naivete of Shaker Heights. 418
U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Writing for th6 dissent, Justice Brennan indicated that "the appearance of
favoritism can be avoided by the evenhanded regulation of time, place and manner for
all advertising, irrespective of subject matter." 41& U.S. at 322.
79. Justice Biennan argued that "[c] learly, such ephemeral concerns do not pro-
vide the city with carte blanche authority to exclude an entire category of speech from
a public forum." Id.
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C. The Douglas Concurrence
In concurring in the judgment, Justice Douglas focused on more
cogent arguments regarding the nature of the proposed forum and the
level of interference with its primary use. However, he not only ig-
nored the fact that other advertising already existed, but his examina-
tion of the competing factors reflected an insensitivity toward the na-
ture of Lehman's message. Moreover, he was inconsistent in his dis-
cussion of the public forum.
Justice Douglas argued that the "[b] uses are not recreational vehi-
cles used for Sunday chautauquas," 80 and to open a forum in such
circumstances "overlooks the constitutional rights of the commuters."81
Elaborating on this theme, Justice Douglas stated:82
In my view, the right of the commuters to be free from forced intru-
sion on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles
of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas
upon their captive audience.
According to Justice Douglas, the city thus possessed the power to
exclude speech activity selectively because of the inappropriateness of
the proposed forum.
Justice Douglas' invocation of a right of privacy argument springs
from his dissent in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack.83 While he
there articulated a constitutional basis for preventing the bus company
from infringing on its passengers' privacy, he also sowed the seed of a
rebuttal argument. Although he found a right to privacy within a per-
son's home under the fourth amendment, he also recognized that "[a]
man loses that privacy of course when he goes upon the streets or en-
ters public places."84 Thus, while a man's home is his castle, a public
bus is not his private chariot.
More important, however, is the fact that the transit district already
accepted advertising. Any right of privacy which the patron could as-
sert had already been infringed. As indicated above, the marginal ef-
fect of selling political advertising, especially placards as unobtrusive
as Lehman's, would be slight.85 Thus, while Justice Douglas' argu-
80. 418 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
84. Id. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
85. See note 76 and accompanying text supra. The dissent in the state court opinion
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ment would have some credence if all advertising were proscribed, it
is less compelling where only selective proscription occurs. 86
Justice Douglas' conception of the public forum is unclear. He re-
cited the familiar language of Hague v. CIO and indicated that a bus
is not tantamount to a park. Thus, he stated: "The fact that it is owned
and operated by the city does not without more make it a forum. 8 7
However, he then analogized the restrictions on advertising, on Shaker
Heights' buses to regulation of highway road signs pursuant to the
Highway Beautification Act. The latter appears to be a regulation of
time, place, and manner within a traditional forum, not a conclusion
that no public forum exists.
Justice Douglas then indicated that if a bus can be considered a
forum, it is more analogous to a newspaper than to a park because an
owner possesses the power to exclude. This analogy, however, fails to
recognize that within a forum as defined by the public place cases,
discrimination based on content has been held expressly impermis-
sible.88
Thus, Justice Douglas confused, as did the plurality, the discrete
inquiries of public forum analysis. Moreover, he did not recognize
that even if a forum exists, advertising is subject to time, place, and
manner regulation. Therefore, finding a public forum on a rapid
transit bus would not represent the wholesale invasion of a passenger's
interest that Justice Douglas fears. It would only recognize the exist-
ence of an area open to the exercise of appropriately regulated first
amendment activity.
in Lehman pointed out that the city had already decided that advertising warranted
infringement of the passengers' rights:
In deciding to create such an arena, the city examined the detrimental effects
which such displays might have on the primary purpose of transporting people,
apparently finding that the primary function could be accomplished while gaining
the pecuniary advantage of providing space for the display of paid commercial
advertising.
296 N.E.2d 683, 689 (Stern, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
86. 418 U.S. at 315. Justice Brennan pointed out another fallacy of the captive
audience argument. He maintained that it could not dispose of first and fourteenth
amendment issues in Lehman because the policy affected advertising outside as well
as inside the cars: "Whatever applicability a 'captive audience' theory may have to
interior advertising, it simply cannot justify the city's refusal to rent Lehman exterior
advertising space," Id. at 320 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 306 (Douglas, J., concurring).
88. See text accompanying note 38 supra. Justice Douglas' analogy also failed to
perceive a more fundamental distinction. Proscription of advertising on a public bus
constitutes state action where a similar limitation by a newspaper does not. See The
Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 43, 152 (1974).
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D. The Brennan Dissent
Justice Brennan, upset at what he perceived to be an insensitivity to
first amendment issues, 89 argued that a public forum existed on
Shaker Heights' buses and that both the free speech and equal protec-
tion clauses precluded the exclusion of Lehman's advertisements be-
cause no substantial justification existed for the -city's policy. In rebut-
ting the arguments of Justices Blackmun and Douglas, Justice
Brennan distinguished the separate inquiries of traditional public
forum analysis. In applying them, however, he too blended the tests of
the bifurcated approach.
According to Justice Brennan, the Court must "assess the import-
ance of the primary use to which the public property or facility is
committed and the extent to which that use will be disrupted if access
for free expression is permitted" 90 to determine whether a public
forum exists. The extent of such interference should be determined by
striking a balance between the competing interests of the government
and that of the individual speaker and his audience. 9 1 Thus, the
strength of the individual party's interest will in part determine
whether a public forum for all persons exists. In the factual setting of
Lehman, Justice Brennan found this determination unnecessary be-
cause he concluded that the city voluntarily established a public forum
by accepting commercial advertising in its buses.9 2
Having found a public forum, Justice Brennan concluded that the
justifications advanced by the respondents failed to meet the burdens
imposed by the test applicable in the second part of the bifurcated
approach. In articulating the test, Justice Brennan utilized the same
approach and the same factors which he indicated were applicable in
determining the existence of a public forum. According to Justice
Brennan, the existence of a public forum and the susceptibility of an
89. Justice Brennan maintained that Lehman's message was precisely the genre to
which the New York Times decision was directed. 418 U.S. at 310-11 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See note 68 supra.
90. 418 U.S. at 312.
91. Id.
92. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan relied on a kind of first amendment
waiver or estoppel argument:
By accepting commercial and public service advertising, the city effectively waived
any argument that advertising in its transit cars is incompatible with the rapid
transit system's primary function of providing transportation.
Id. at 314. The dissent in the Ohio Supreme Court opinion reached the same conclu-
sion. 296 N.E.2d at 690 (Stern, J., dissenting).
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individual speaker to regulation of time, place and manner are both
determined by an ad hoe balancing test which includes, inter alia,
consideration of the interests of the individual and his particular audi-
ence. Thus, while he recognized the bifurcation of public forum anal-
ysis, Justice Brennan blended the analytically discrete tests.
III. THE LEHMAN PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE-AN
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC FORUM
ANALYSIS
The prevailing arguments in Lehman represent an insensitivity to
important first amendment issues. The Court did not adequately eval-
uate the competing interests, but rather substituted assertions and rhe-
toric for the careful analysis required when such fundamental consti-
tutional rights are involved.
More important, all the opinions in Lehman demonstrated a defi-
cient methodology for use of public forum analysis in nontraditional'
arenas. Each opinion blended the analytically discrete tests involved
in these determinations. The plurality and concurring opinions also
illustrated a failure to distinguish between the results of these tests,
i.e., the difference between the determination that a public forum ex-
ists and the determination that a particular activity is subject to regu-
lation of time, place and manner within such a forum.
As long as the Court expanded the parameters of the public forum, 93
this analytic shortcoming did not make a difference in judicial re-
sults. Even if the Court blended the discrete tests or combined them
fully into a unitary one, the conclusion that an activity was protected
necessarily incorporated the conclusion that a public forum existed. In
terms of the diagram above,94 finding an activity protected (i.e.,
placing it at Point A) presupposes finding a forum at Test 1 and pro-
tection at Test 2. As Lehman illustrates, however, the failure to distin-
93. This expansion in the private property cases reached its zenith in Amalgamated
Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968). In the public
property context, with the exception of Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), the
Court has consistently expanded the parameters of the public forum. In cases where
speech activity has been found to be unprotected, it has been clear that the regulation
was of time, place and manner within clearly existent forums. See, e.g., Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Compare
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) with Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
94. See Part I-A supra.
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guish between the two inquiries can produce confusion when no pro-
tection is afforded the speech because it is not clear whether the Court
has found that no public forum existed (Point C) or whether a forum
existed but the specific activity was proscribed (Point B).
The danger of Lehman is in its value as precedent. The Court,
while speaking the rhetoric of a bifurcated approach, in fact utilized a
unitary test to determine that no public forum existed. 95 As suggested
above,96 in subsequent litigation a court could preclude a first amend-
ment challenge concerning a public bus because it accepted the con-
clusion that no forum existed. Therefore, the result of Lehman's balanc-
ing test would become determinative in all subsequent assertions
of first amendment rights in analogous settings, regardless of the
strength of factors militating for protection of a subsequent litigant in
Test 2. This danger suggests that Lehman should be construed as con-
cluding only that no public forum existed vis-a-vis the particular ac-
tivity involved there.97 This could be done in either of two ways.
First, a court could utilize the traditional bifurcated approach and
conclude that, despite its language, Lehman held only that the partic-
ular activity in question was not protected. This conclusion would
allow a court to assume that a public forum exists on buses, and to
weigh the relevant factors in Test 2 in the new litigation to determine
if the activity there was protected. Alternatively, a court could use
both discrete tests and re-examine whether a bus is indeed a public
forum. To avoid the pitfalls of Lehman, the court would have to care-
fully elucidate the considerations in Tests 1 and 2 to ensure that a
potential conclusion of no public forum was not based on limitations
peculiar to the individual litigant.
The second possibility would be to expressly recognize the use of a
single ad hoc balancing approach. This would amount to explicit
adoption of the approach tacitly utilized by the plurality in Lehman.
A party's particular interests, and the general interest in providing a
95. See text accompanying notes 48 & 49 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
97. At least one court has declined to read Lehman expansively and distinguished
it on this basis:
The Lehman case, settling an equal protection argument as to access to car card
spaces in the vehicles of a city-owned rapid transit system, is based almost en-
tirely upon the nature of the free speech expression involved therein, display ad-
vertising, as to which the passenger's eye is captive.
Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975).
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forum at that location, would be balanced with the specific interfer-
ences involved and general considerations militating against the exer-
cise of first amendment rights. However, the result of this balancing
process in an individual case would not be determinative of the exist-
ence of a public forum for future litigants. In essence, a single loca-
tion would have one catalogue of protected activities and another of
those unprotected.
An analysis of the efficacy of these approaches in protecting speech
activity can be made with the diagram used above. In addition, a
second diagram illustrates the alternatives under the unitary ap-
proach.
Protected
orum 
Protected
Fnrum (T1 + T2)
No Forum Unprotected Unprotected
As has been suggested,9 8 under the bifurcated approach an initial
determination is made whether a public forum exists. This test is rep-
resented by T 1. If a forum is found, a subsequent test (T2) is utilized to
determine if a particular activity is protected. Upder a unitary ap-
proach, factors considered in T. and T2 are combined into a single
inquiry (T1 + T2).
Both approaches achieve similar results where T1 finds a public
forum and T2 concludes that an activity is protected. Conversely, if
T, finds no public forum, and factors against protection of the indi-
vidual activity outweigh those for protection, none exists under either
approach.
However, where T1 and T 2 reach opposite results, the bifurcated and
unitary approaches can yield different outcomes. As has been sug-
gested,99 under the bifurcated approach the conclusion that no public
forum exists precludes the use of T2. Theoretically, the interests of the
individual at T2 may be so substantial that under a unitary approach
they would more than counterbalance the factors militating against
finding a public forum. A similarly inconsistent outcome is possible if
the interests in maintaining a forum are substantial enough to out-
98. See Part I-A supra.
99. Id.
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weigh the negative factors which by themselves would lead to the con-
clusion that the individual activity would be unprotected.
The combination of possible outcomes under the two approaches
can be illustrated in the following matrix. An upward arrow ( T ) indi-
cates that under the appropriate test counterbalancing factors yield
the conclusion that a forum exists (Tj) or that an activity is protected
(T2). A downward arrow (4,) indicates no forum or no protection.100
Unitary Bifurcated
1 T,1' T 2 " protected protected
2 T, '' T2 4, (T1 < T2 ) unprotected unprotected
3 T, ' T2 4, (T1 > T2) protected unprotected
4 T, 4 T2 4, unprotected unprotected
5 T, 4, T 2 '' (TI > T2) unprotected unprotected
6 T, 4. T2 ' (TI < T2) protected unprotected
The matrix suggests that two cases theoretically exist where the uni-
tary test affords protection and where the bifurcated test does not.
Translation of these theoretical possibilities into actual application may
minimize the differences. Indeed, practice may demonstrate that situa-
tions (3) and (6) above are in fact null sets.10' However, the ma-
trix does demonstrate that the outcome can vary with the approach
utilized. If the goal is protecting freedom of expression as mandated
by the first amendment, the purpose is better served by the unitary
approach, which consistently provides at least comparable, and theo-
retically superior, protection of these rights.
David D. Swartling
100. The symbol "- means "greater than" and the symbol "<- means "less
than." Therefore, if T1 < T1"2, the interests of the individual at T2 would be greater
than the factors militating against finding a public forum at T1 .
101. Hypothetical cases can be suggested, however, which may reflect such situa-
tions. For example, soliciting signatures for a referendum on utility rates outside the
local company's office may represent situation (6). If a bus does indeed represent a
significant available medium for less wealthy groups, as suggested in note 63 supra. the
facts of Lehman arguably represent situation (3).
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